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The economics of internal organization [e.g. Spence (1975), Williamson, Wachter
and Harris (1975), Stiglitz (1975), Mirrlees (1975),  the New Institutional Economics
(Williamson ,1985) and the New Classical Microeconimics (Yang and Ng, 1993) provide a
dynamic new approach to industrial organization.  Long standing dissatisfaction with
representing the firm as nothing more than a production function has led to exciting
investigations into organizational matters such as contractual form, methods of
compensation, hierarchy, and vertical integration.  Our purpose here is to synthesize this
theory as it applies to labor contracts and the nature of the agricultural firm, illustrate how
the theory can be used to explain empirical patterns in the employment relation, and
extend the theory to explain particular patterns in agricultural labor contracts.  Our
primary objective is to demonstrate the utility of the theory for explaining agricultural
organization and to suggest a methodology for empirical investigation.
1.1 Piece Rates, Time Rates and Teams
This section illustrates how the economics of internal organization can be used to
explain patterns in agricultural labor contracts.  Piece rates tend to be chosen over time
rates for tasks where shirking is easy monitor by ex post inspection.  The incidence of
piece rates is also higher where the work force is more heterogeneous, where high
opportunity wages prevail and where some agricultural operations are done by specialized
teams.  These relationships are implied by the proposition that contracts minimize excess
burden in the face of enforcement and information costs.2
1.1.1 Information costs and the theory of labor contracts
The competitive theory of contracts [Cheung (1969), Newbery (1974), Reid
(1976), Roumasset (1979)] may be paraphrased as follows:  if contracting costs are small
and the numbers of economic agents of all types are large, then no contracting solution
which does not approximate a competitive equilibrium can be an equilibrium solution [see
also Arrow (1969) and Hildebrand (1977)].  This theory has been used to explain the
terms of contracts, for example, cross-sectional and temporal differences in the percentage
shares going to various parties in share contracts [Roumasset and James (1979)].  The
theory is not useful, however, for explaining the choice among alternative forms of
contracts and methods of organizing production.  For the latter, we need a comparative
institutions framework [Coase (1960), Demsetz (1969)].
An institution is a system of rules which delineates guidelines of interaction among
members of a social system [Roberts and Holdren (1972), Ruttan (1978, p. 329)].  A
contract is a specific type of institution.  The economic function of institutions is to
economize on transactions costs, in particular, enforcement and information costs
[Roumasset (1974), Anderson and Hill (1975), North (1977), Williamson (1980)].  Thus
the competitive theory of contracts, which abstracts from transaction costs, is inadequate
to explain institutional form. An alternative theory is that institutions evolve so as to
minimize excess burden [Demsetz (1972), Roumasset (1978 and 1979)].
Stiglitz implicitly applies the latter principle to the choice of piece rates versus time
rates [see also Lucas (1979)].  Time rates are alleged to induce "effort shirking," which
can be mitigated by supervision.  Piece rates are thought to avoid effort shirking but
permit "quality shirking."  Where quality shirking is easy to detect, it can be limited by a
modest amount of supervision.
Stiglitz also showed that piece rates can be used to screen out less productive
workers when the quality of workers is variable and unknown.  It is possible to set piece3
rates sufficiently low that only the most skilled workers will receive their opportunity
wage and accept the job.
For some tasks, it will be difficult to set the piece rate to equate the marginal
product of labor with the implicit wage, even if the ability of the worker is unknown.  The
loss in such cases of setting the piece rate too high is roughly equal to the difference
between the implicit and opportunity wages times the quantity of labor employed.  The
disadvantage of setting the rate too low is that workers will not accept work or they will
quit once they learn the implicit wage.  Time rates will therefore tend to be chosen in such
situations.
In order to predict and/or explain empirical patterns concerning the choice
between piece rates and time rates, we need a model which incorporates the
considerations above. Our model should integrate the problem of comparing the excess
burden of alternate contracts with the problem of investing in the optimal amounts of
monitoring and screening activities.
1 It wold not be appropriate to compare, for example,
piece and time rates where information was assumed to be identical in both cases.  Rather
a piece rate contract, with its own optimal amount of enforcement and information, must
be compared to a time rate contract with its optimal amount of enforcement and
information.
There has been some confusion about the source of shirking.  Alchian and Demsetz
(1972) held that it is the difficulty of knowing each worker's contribution to total output
which led to the problem.  Other authors [e.g., Mirrlees (1975)] have correctly observed
that it is only necessary to know the inputs of workers to be able to pay workers their
marginal products.
It is instructive here to view workers as producing intermediate products (e.g.,
sugarcane planted or harvested, weeds removed) which in turn are inputs to the final
product (sugarcane).  The problem now is to estimate the quantity of intermediate inputs.
                                                       
1Stiglitz (1975) discusses both problems, but not in a unified framework.4
Represent output, Q, as function of a vector of intermediate inputs, X, and the
state of the world, q.  X in turn is produced as a function of labor quantity, N, average
quality, ß, and effort, e.  Summarizing,
(1) Q=Q(q,X),
(2) X=ƒ(b,e,N)
 Management seeks to estimate X.  The better the estimate, the closer management
can come to paying workers their marginal products and avoiding shirking.  Management's
optimization problem is to select a reward function and a level of supervision/monitoring
so as to maximize profits.
Piece rates and time rates, each combined with its own standards and penalties, are
examples of reward functions.  For both payment systems, reward depends on estimated
X. In the case of piece rates, X is estimated by directly observing the result of a worker's
effort, e.g., planted cane standing in a field.  Standards, e.g., about the uniformity of
planted cane, and penalties are also related to direct observation of  X.  To the extent that
standards and penalties are associated with discrete categories, workers will have an
incentive to perform close to the minimum that is required to be classified in a particular
category.  More generally, the reward function does not pay the worker the full increase in
profits associated with improvements in the quality of his work.  For example, if a worker
allows a small enough variation in the uniformity of planted cane, his reward will not be
diminished.  As a result, piece rates are associated with "quality shirking."
In the case of time rates, X is estimated indirectly via estimates of ß, e, and N and
the function ƒ(ß,e,N).  Penalties are associated with standards and observations relating to
e. Since the employer's estimate of e depends partially on factors out of the worker's
control (e.g., past performance, race, age, sex), the reward function does not provide the
worker with the full increase in profits associated with an increase in effort.  We call this
"effort shirking."5
We can now view labor contracts or reward functions as determined according to
the following model.  The employer chooses the quantity of labor, N, expenditures on
supervision, S, and the reward function, Ri, in order to
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where q is a random variable on the 0-1 interval, with density function p(q), P is output
price, and C is the cost function.  The worker chooses effort and some aspects of work
quality (e.g., diligence, care) so as to maximize utility, i.e..,






where  ¢  X   = g(S,b,e) is the employer's estimate of the laborer's product X.
Conditions 3 and 4 combined with the condition that the employer must pay the
worker his opportunity utility level [see Stiglitz (1975), Newbery and Stiglitz (1979)], give
rise to a determinate contract.
By making additional assumptions, e.g, that there is a fixed penalty for being
caught shirking under time rates and that the probability of being caught is a concave
function of supervision [see, e.g., Calvo and Wellisz (1979)], we get the natural
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for the ith reward function.
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To facilitate the graphical exposition below, we further assume that there is no effort
shirking under piece rates and no quality shirking under wage rates.  In terms of our
model, this follows from the more basic assumptions that
                                                       

















g f t = ,
where gp and gt are the functions for estimating X for piece rates and time rates
respectively.
Also note that maximizing profits is the same as minimizing the difference between
what profits would be if contracts could be perfectly and costlessly enforced and profits
under costly supervision and information.  This difference between "first-best" and
"second-best" profits may be called excess burden, borrowing the name of the same
concept from the optimal taxation literature.
3  More formally, define excess burden of the
ith reward function as
EBiii =- ￿￿ pp 12
where  ￿ p 1i  and  ￿ p 2i are the first- and second-best profit maxima.  That is,  ￿ p 2i is the
solution of eq. (3) and  ￿ p 1i is the profit maximum given by
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where X is costlessly observed.
4  For graphical convenience, we further define shirking
cost as
(10) CE BS ii i =- ,
or
EB C S ii i =+
recalling that Si is expenditure on supervision for the ith reward function.
                                                       
3As in optimal taxation, one should not take "excess" in the literal sense of implying the feasibility of reducing the
burden.  This poses a problem in optimal semantics.  "Excess burden" is an imprecise term for a precise concept.
While changing the term may have ceratin pedagogical advantages, there would be sizeable transaction costs of
doing so.  (This footnote is dedicated to Armen Alchian.)
4Formally, lim
S XX
®¥ ¢ = , where s is the quantity of supervision/information and SP S S = .  Now for costless
information, Ps = 0, the employer can be regarded as knowing X.  Both piece and time rates are capable of
achieving the first-best optimum.7
We can now graph excess burden as the sum of supervision expenditures and
shirking costs.  In fig. 1, we use excess burden graphs to illustrate the hypothesis that the
incidence of piece rate contracts is inversely related to the difficulty of monitoring quality
shirking.  Fig. 1a represents a task for which quality shirking is easy to monitor so that
quality shirking is less costly than effort shirking.  This is reflected by the rapid decline of
Cp and its relatively low position with a small amount of supervision.9
Figs. 1c and 1d represent a task for which quality shirking is harder to detect.
Accordingly, Cp in fig. 1c is substantially higher than in 1a.  On the other hand, Ct in fig.
1d is unaffected by the difficulty of monitoring quality shirking, reflecting the assumption
in eq. (8).  Also note that Cp is relatively flat in figs. 1a and 1c at higher levels of
supervision.  This captures the assumption that the marginal product of supervision at high
levels of supervision is relatively low under piece rates.
Since supervision is measured in monetary units, the cost of supervision is a 45
degree line.
5  Excess burden, EB, is the sum of S and C.  Profit-maximizing supervision,
S*, occurs where EB is at a minimum.  Comparing the top two diagrams we see that fig.
1a has the least minimum excess burden.  That is, where quality shirking is "easy" to
monitor, our theory predicts that piece rates will be chosen.
Fig. 1c illustrates the proposition that as the difficulty of monitoring quality
shirking increases, the cost of shirking rises for a given amount of supervision.  It follows
then that if difficulty is increased "enough," that the minimum excess burden of piece rates
will rise above that of time rates and time rates will be preferred.
Fig. 1 has been constructed to illustrate the optimality of piece rates for the "easy-
to-monitor" case.  Clearly the curves could have been drawn so that piece rates (or time
rates) dominate in both cases.  The critical point is that piece rates reduce effort shirking
and that quality shirking is more responsive to monitoring for tasks which are easy to
monitor.  This leads to the comparative statics proposition that the greater the difficulty of
detecting quality shirking, the less will be the incidence of piece rates.
6
A similar analysis can be applied where there is difficulty in setting the appropriate
piece rate.  In such cases, there is an additional source of excess burden.  In terms of fig.
                                                       
5Since supervision is a composite of several activities, we assume that any expenditure, S, will be spent in the
most effective way.
6If we extend Stiglitz's framework to cover this case, the result is that as monitoring quality shirking becomes
more difficult, the proportion of the worker's reward coming from the "incentive payment" (piece rate) becomes
larger.10
1, we can imagine curve Cp rising as the uncertainty about the appropriate piece rate rises.
Clearly it is possible that curve Cp will rise enough so that time rates will be preferred.
The quality variable, ß, is affected both by factors controlled by the worker and by
factors out of his control in the short run.  In the discussion of quality shirking, we have
dealt with the former.  We now investigate the case where workers differ according to
inherent quality, i.e., skill.  By investing in knowledge about worker quality, the employer
can decrease the probability that a worker's quality will differ from the predicted value by
more than some arbitrary e.  That is, knowledge "squeezes" the probability distribution of
worker quality about the true quality.  To the extent that the frequency distributions of
workers are characterized by large variances, the employer will tend to lose profits in the
selection process.  For example, if wages are set higher than the opportunity cost of the
desired employee, then wages will be unnecessarily high.  If the wage is set too low,
however, the desired employees will not accept work and the marginal product of
attracted workers will be lower than anticipated.  Thus, the employer faces a tradeoff
between collecting information about worker quality or suffering a loss of profits due to
his inability to equate wage with marginal product and to select appropriate workers.
Piece rates, however, can economize on the cost of collecting information about
workers.  It is possible, for example, that piece rates can be set sufficiently low that only
workers who are "fast" at a particular task will accept the job.  Others will find that their
implicit wage is lower than their opportunity wage [Stiglitz (1975)].  This sorting function
is called "screening by self-selection."
7  Thus one would except, ceteris paribus, that a
greater degree of worker heterogeneity would lead to a greater incidence of piece rate
contracts.
In summary, we expect the incidence of piece rates to be higher the easier it is to
monitor quality shirking, the easier it is to set piece rates to equate the implicit wage with
                                                       
7Hallagan (1977, 1978) and Newbery and Stiglitz (1979) develop this argument for the case of rent, wage, and
share contracts.  See also Salop and Salop (1976).11
the opportunity wage, and the greater the heterogeneity of the work force.  These
tendencies hold even when information and enforcement are choice variables to the firm.
1.2 An Application to Philippine Sugarcane Farms
This section illustrates how the theory developed above can be used to document
and explain actual patterns found in labor arrangements.  The application uses empirical
evidence on labor contracts used by selected sugarcane farms in the Philippines.  The
sample was chosen in order to obtain substantial contrast regarding certain agroeconomic
characteristics like land quality, wage rates and farm sizes, given the preliminary
hypothesis that these factors play an important role in determining choice of contracts.
Data was gathered from four provinces:  Batangas, Tarlac, Laguna, and Negros
Occidental.  Three municipalities were picked out from each province for a total of twelve
survey areas.  The farm was the unit of analysis and five farms were chosen from each
municipality for a total of 60 respondents.  In the choice of survey areas, the purposive
sampling technique was used and was geared towards attaining the maximum contrast
among the prevailing contractual arrangements [see Uy (1979) for additional details].
A variety of arrangements were noted among the sample farms.  Table 1 presents
the incidence of piece and wage contracts for various tasks.
8  "Pakyaw" is a type of piece
rate wherein workers are paid according to the land area covered.  "Pakyaw" dominates
land preparation, weeding and cultivation.  Labor hired for cutting canepoints and
harvesting is paid almost exclusively by piece rates.  Chemical application tends toward
the use of time rates.
                                                       
8Respondents which utilized only family labor for certain tasks and those which did not perform certain operations
are also indicated.  Sample farms which had only ratoon crops for the surveyed crop year, 1977-1978, for instance,
did not have land preparation and planting operations.13
A comparison of cross-task characteristics provides some explanation of the
relative preference for piece rates for some tasks and time rates for others.  In cutting
canepoints, workers are normally paid according to the volume of canepoints cut (per
10,000 or 1,000 points).  In harvesting, workers are paid according to the weight
harvested or on a tonnage basis.  The difficulty of completing these tasks is sufficiently
easy to access so as to make both parties aware of the implicit wages of the workers.  The
quantity of the work done in canepoint cutting can easily be checked by observing the
finished output and insuring that an accurate number of canepoints is reported.
Quality shirking is relatively easy to control for both harvesting and canepoint
cutting by observing labor's intermediate product.  In harvesting, inspection of the output
and the harvested land will indicate the thoroughness of the completed work.  Cane that
has not been cut sufficiently close to the ground will be readily detected.  That is,
harvesting fits the "easy-to-monitor" case in fig. 1 and the diagram therefore explains the
preference for piece rates in harvesting.  Application of chemicals (including fertilization)
fits the "hard-to-monitor" case since it is difficult to determine whether or not the
chemicals have been uniformly applied. As expected, chemical application is usually done
on a wage basis.
The highly seasonal character and high labor requirements of harvesting lead to
comparatively high costs of recruiting and gathering information about prospective
workers. The harvesting season comes almost simultaneously to all sugarcane farms within
a given area and results in extensive use of migrant workers.  The farm operator is faced
with the problem of screening the workers or assessing the relative abilities of each of the
workers. Since piece rates allow workers to select themselves on the basis of their
expected performance, piece rates offer an additional advantage in harvesting.
Table 1 also shows that when the farm operator owns a tractor, he pays the tractor
operator with time rates.  If the tractor is rented, piece rates are used.  We should add,
however, that it is the tractor which is being hired on a piece rate basis.  The tractor14
operator is paid by the tractor owner on a wage basis.  We presume that tractor operators
are paid by wages because of possible capital maintenance problems associated with piece
rates.  Just as a piece rate worker will not be motivated to maintain high standards of
quality, he will also not be motivated to avoid abuse of the equipment and tools of his job.
1.3 Piece Rates with Teams:  Decentralization, Specialization and
Inventing-by-Doing
In the preceding sections, we have synthesized the theory of labor contracts
developed within the field of industrial organization and applied it to labor contracts in
sugar production. In this section, we extend the theory to incorporate an additional
institution—piece rates with teams.
The economic function of teams is to reduce excess burden associated with
centralized management.  The Marschak-Radner concept of establishing a network of
autonomous but coordinated decision makers is just one function of teams.  The functions
of selection, enforcement, and internal organization are included in a broader
conceptualization. Complementarity of inputs, the issue stressed by Alchian and Demsetz
is not critical to the teams.  One can exploit complementary inputs without teams, and
teams may be useful even if inputs are not complementary.
Piece rates with teams motivate decentralization of three types.  First, there is an
incentive for decentralization of supervision.  Effort shirking would reduce the team's
payment.  Quality shirking would impair the team contractor's reputation.  Since the team
leader knows the members, he can presumably supervise more efficiently than an outsider.
Teams also facilitate decentralization of decision making about internal
organization. The team can establish its own specialization, internal supervision, and
system of rewards. Since teams do similar jobs for many employers, workers continue to
perform similar tasks in similar production systems across several employers.  This15
facilitates not only learning-by-doing but encourages "inventing-by-doing" as well.  As
Adam Smith (1937, p. 14) noted,
"Men are much more likely to discover easier and readier methods of attaining any
object, when the whole attention of their minds is directed towards that single
object...."
Organization by teams may also economize on information about the quality of
workers.  By selecting their own members, each team can take advantage of its own
information about a small part of the work force.  That is, where information is diffuse,
decentralization economizes on information costs.  Since piece rates reward the team
according to its total productivity, they will have the incentive to select workers who are
appropriate for the various tasks.
In summary, piece rates in combination with teams provide an additional institution
whereby the excess burden associated with information and enforcement costs can be
reduced. Specifically, the combination facilitates decentralization of three types.
Decentralization of supervision economizes on supervision costs by making it worthwhile
for workers to monitor themselves.  Decentralization of selection makes efficient use of
the team's own knowledge of a small part of the work force (friends, relatives, townmates,
etc.).  Decentralization of organization similarly makes efficient use of a team's own
information about the comparative advantages of the team members.
Piece rates paid to teams was a common arrangement for harvesting sugarcane on
our sample farms.  Harvesting teams usually service numerous farms in an area.  For large
haciendas, teams typically work the whole season for one employer.  Employers often
deal with the same contractor year-after-year.  This maintains an incentive to limit quality
shirking.
In our sample, teams generally divided the proceeds equally among team members.
The exception was the team leader who received a 10% surcharge above the piece rate.
This suggests that contractors are successful in selecting harvesters with roughly equal16
ability. Since the screening function of piece rates still applies with teams, we would
expect these workers to be comparatively proficient.
1.4 Explaining Patterns Involving Factor Prices, Land Quality, and 
Size of Enterprise
The purpose of this section is to incorporate determinants of labor contracts which
are likely to be important in agricultural settings wherein factor markets are not necessarily
highly developed. These determinants include factor prices, land quality, and farm size.
In highly integrated market economies, there is a tendency towards factor price
equalization.  This may explain why the economics of internal organization has neglected
the role that factor prices play in organizational form.  In rural areas of developing
countries, however, factor immobilities, transportation costs and other barriers to trade
allow substantial variation in factor prices from one location to another.
Wage rates as a reflection of labor scarcity are likely to be of particular importance
not only for the terms but for the forms of labor contracts.  Fig. 2 illustrates the specific
hypothesis that the incidence of piece rates tends to increase with higher wages.  Figs. 2a
and 2b illustrate a high wage case wherein piece rates dominate wage rates.  Roughly
speaking, the cost of effort shirking outweighs the cost of quality shirking.  For the low
wage case, however, the cost of effort shirking can be reduced substantially by
substituting relatively cheap labor for the time lost at a given level of supervision.  This is
illustrated by the curve, CT, in fig. 2d, which lies substantially below that in fig. 2b.18
In contrast, curve Cp in fig. 2c lies only slightly below that in 2a.  This reflects the
assumption that labor quantity is not a good substitute for labor quality.  To some extent,
it may be worthwhile with cheap labor to repair some of the losses associated with quality
shirking, but this method will be more costly than doing the task carefully in the first place.
As a result, the advantage of piece rates over time rates will decline as wages fall.
The graphs embody the additional assumption that the wages or opportunity costs
of supervisors rise with the general wage level.  This effect is represented by a parallel
rightward shift of the shirking cost curves and a corresponding upward shift of the excess
burden curves along a 45 degree diagonal line.  This has no effect on the relative positions
of EBp and EBT nor on contract choice.  It only raises equilibrium expenditures on
supervision.
The analysis is more ambiguous in the case of variations in land quality.  First, note
that higher land quality implies a higher profit maximizing level of labor per hectare.  With
more workers, time rates will lead to higher effort shirking for high land quality at each
level of supervision.  For piece rates, not only does higher labor intensity lead to greater
(quality) shirking but a given level of shirking will presumably  lead to a higher loss in
yield for highly productive land.  This would not be an important factor, however, where
quality shirking is easy to monitor.  In summary, better land quality will lead to higher
levels of supervision but may not be a major factor in the choice of wage versus piece
rates.
Farm size is expected to be a positive force in the selection of piece rates.  This is
due to the tendency for piece rate workers to be hired through middlemen and employed
in teams. Wage workers are more often contracted on a direct hire basis.  A small farmer
may be able to rely on acquaintances to satisfy his demand for workers whereas a larger
operation would benefit from the services of middlemen.  Moreover, the use of piece work
with teams is subject to economies-of-scale up to the point where the optimum team size
is reached.  To the extent that higher land quality leads to more workers per hectare, the19
economies-of-scale advantages of piece rates may also play a role in the higher land
quality areas.
The role of wages, land quality, and farm size for the sample of Philippine
sugarcane farms is shown in table 2.  Probit analysis was used to regress a dummy variable
for choice of contract (1 if piece rate; 0 if time rate) on a wage index (average daily wage),
an index of land quality (implicit rent)
9 and farm size.
                                                       
9Implicit rent was defined as value of yield less value of all inputs [see Uy (1979) for additional details].21
As expected, the wage variable was significant and positively related to the choice
of piece rates.  The land quality variable was positive and significant for the planting
operation, and farm size was positive and significant for weeding.  These findings are
consistent with the economies-of-scale advantages of piece work with teams.
These results are only intended to be illustrative of the role of factor scarcity,
factor quality, and economies-of-scale in contract choice.  Larger and more carefully
designed samples, better specification of the functional relationships, and measurement of
additional variables are needed for more conclusive results.  As an example of the
econometric problems, Uy (1979) reported a complex causal relationship between land
quality and farm size.  For family farms, an inverse relationship between farm size and land
quality was observed, but for plantations, the relationship was positive.  Further studies
should also investigate the importance of the size of the labor force in the area and level of
labor market development.
1.5 Summary and Implications
The purpose of section 7.1 has been to synthesize, apply, and extend the theory of
the employment relation to facilitate explanations of agricultural organization, especially in
areas without highly developed labor markets.  The theory developed in 7.1.1 differs from
other treatments in two respects.  First, the firm's investment in supervision and
information is treated as endogenous.  Second, labor is viewed as producing an
intermediate product which itself is an input in the final production function.
The profit-maximizing labor contract is the one which minimizes the excess burden
associated with the costs of monitoring plus the profits lost from "shirking" at a particular
supervision level.  Where the worker's intermediate product can be directly observed,
piece rates provide a device for paying the worker according to the marginal product of
the intermediate product he has produced.  Where the quality of the worker's intermediate22
product can be readily assessed, piece rates avoid effort shirking and will not induce
substantial "quality shirking."
The theory also predicts that the incidence of piece rates will increase with
heterogeneity of the work force because piece rates facilitate "screening by self-selection."
Piece rates will tend not to be used, however, where it is difficult to set the rate to equate
marginal product with the opportunity wage.  Since this problem can be ameliorated by
collecting information about the time it takes to complete a particular task, it is now time
rates that economize on information costs.
Section 7.1.2 illustrates how the theory can be applied by documenting and
explaining patterns in the employment relation.  For the Philippine application, the
hypothesis about quality shirking proved to be the most useful.  For harvesting and
canepoint cutting, where quality shirking can be easily detected by visual inspection when
work has been completed, piece rates are chosen in almost 100% of the cases.
Section 7.1.3 extended the theory of labor contracts to include piece rate with
teams. When the employer pays piece rates directly to a team, there are a number of
additional potential advantages.  For one, production teams which specialize in specific
tasks (e.g., harvesting cane) are able to evolve more efficient systems of internal
organization within the team.  In addition, since teams recruit their own members, adverse
selection problems are reduced.  Finally, quality shirking is reduced due to the necessity
for the team to maintain a good reputation.
Section 7.1.4 extends the theory to incorporate some determinants of agricultural
organization which have been omitted from the industrial organization literature.  The role
of factor prices, which may vary widely in rural economies, was stressed.  In particular,
low wages favor time rates since cheap labor can be more readily substituted for time lost
in effort shirking than it can be for quality shirking.  The Philippine evidence supported
this hypothesis.23
There was also weak evidence that economies-of-scale favor piece rates.  This
follows from the tendency to use piece rates with teams.  Thus, larger farms may favor
piece rates as may better quality farms, since the latter use more labor per hectare.
While the analysis has not been intended to provide a direct test of the efficiency of
employment contracts, some preliminary policy conclusions emerge.  It has been popular,
especially in the agricultural development literature, to blame falling rural wages on
inefficient institutions or to blame the slow adoption of modern technology on
"institutional constraints."  As we have demonstrated here, however, the wide variation in
observed contracts is not only consistent with efficiency, but the patterns observed are
predicted by efficiency principles.  This conclusion is sufficient to reject a priori
conclusions that agricultural institutions are exploitative and inefficient.
The theory of contract selection developed here can also be used to clarify the
theory of induced institutional change [Demsetz (1969), Davis and North (1971), Ruttan
(1978)] according to which institutions will change when the benefits of the change
exceed the costs. The latter theory is incomplete without a definition of what are the
benefits and costs of institutional change.  The concept of excess burden fills this void.
We can now specify that the theory of institutional change predicts that an institution will
be replaced if its associated excess burden can be reduced by switching to another
institution.  For the case of labor contracts, excess burden can be defined as the difference
between maximum profits with costless information/enforcement and maximum profits
with costly supervision.
Given the limited evidence presented, the various patterns and explanations
discussed are best regarded as hypotheses.  Indeed our main purpose has not been to
formulate "laws" of agricultural contracts but to illustrate what we believe to be a fruitful
methodology.  As additional stylized facts of contracts and other institutions are
documented, we will undoubtedly learn more, in an inductive fashion, about the forces
which determine resource allocation in the face of incomplete markets.24
2.0 Agency Costs and the Agricultural Firm
2.1 The Theory of Share Tenancy:  Why All the Fuss?
In their recent review and synthesis of the economics of agricultural contracts, Hayami and
Otsuka list more than 300 articles dealing with share tenancy, and their list is far from exhaustive.
The reason for this level of attention, in spite of its limited empirical importance, is that share
tenancy holds the key (or at least one of the keys) to the general economics of rural organization.
Joe Stiglitz's (1974) article was particularly seminal, spawning not only the New Industrial
Organization based on principal agency theory but the Economics Rural Organization (Hoff,
et.al., 1993) as well.  As a theory of share tenancy, however, Stiglitz's model is somewhat
misleading.  He assumes that share tenancy is an employment contract and that share tenancy as
well as alternative employment contracts can be represented by the worker's pay off function: Y =
aQ + b, where a is the worker's percentage share of output, Q, and b is a fixed payment --
negative in the case of wage contracts and positive for rental contracts.  The theory is graphically
depicted in Figure 3.  The principal (landowner) chooses the a that minimizes the sum of labor-
shirking costs and risk-bearing costs.  Labor-shirking costs decline to zero as the worker's share
approaches one.  Risk-bearing costs are assumed to increase with the worker's share because
workers are assumed to be more risk averse than landowners.  If the shirking costs are as
illustrated, the optimal share will be roughly one-half, thus accounting for the alleged universality
of the tenant share equalling one-half (Hayami and Otsuka, 1993).25
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         However, no evidence whatsoever has been offered to suggest that the tenant-
landowner risk-aversion differential is anywhere near large enough to offset the labor incentive
advantages of rent contracts.  Figure 4 provides an alternative depiction of the costs of risk-
bearing.  The configuration shown reflects the assumptions that risk-bearing costs of owner-
operators are positive but less than that of renters and that the total risk bearing costs under share
tenancy are intermediate but closer to that of owner-operators.
Share tenancy reduces the costs of risk-bearing relative to renting by first sharing the risk
between landowner and tenant, which reduces risk-bearing cost born by each by more than the
percentage born by the other agent (Arrow and Lind, 1970).  Second, share tenancy increases the
proportion of risk born by the agent with a lower marginal risk premium.  Since the first source of
reduction is maximized at a share of • , the total risk-bearing curve is kinked at that point.  As a
result of these assumptions the total agency cost reaches a local maximum at a = • , but plausibly
reaches a global maximum at a = 1.  In addition, income of owner operators in many parts of the
world is not significantly greater than that of tenants.  Even if landowner incomes are higher, risk
aversion is not strongly, if at all, related to income (Binswanger, 1980, 1981).  Moreover,
agricultural households in countries such as the Philippines have numerous opportunities for
reducing marginal risk premium, including farm enterprise diversification, family income
diversification, and asset-liability management (including credit).  These factors increase the
likelihood that labor shirking costs dominate risk-bearing costs as shown in Figure 4.
In reality, however, both owner-operator and share tenancy contracts are more frequently
observed than rental contracts.  There must be an additional disadvantage of rental contracts.
The most often cited disadvantage of rental contracts other than misallocation of risk-
bearing is land shirking (also called asset shirking).  Land-shirking has not been formally modelled
in the context because of its inherently dynamic character.  The idea is that renters cannot be
effectively bound to long-term contracts and execute an "end move" and "mine" the land in the
last period before quitting the contract.27
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More generally, the problem is binding the renters to an optimal program of investment,
including cropping pattern, maintenance, and land improvements.  Just as renters may breach
multiple period rent contracts and exploit short-run strategies that decrease the land's productive
capacity, landowners may breach promises not to raise the rent and expropriate investments made
by the leasee.
Government possibilities against investment-shirking are discussed in subsequent sections.
For now, it is sufficient to note that the agency costs of investment increase with a.  Adding
investment-shirking costs, Figure 5 shows how share tenancy can emerge as an optimal contract.
Hayami and Otsuka (1993) argue that the costs of asset abuse are minimal because in the
longer run, reputation serves as an effective governance mechanism.  Figure 5 allows that
reputation mitigates investment-shirking but does not eliminate it.  First, if reputation were
completely effective as a governance mechanism, a formal justice system would be unnecessary.
Second, for reasons detailed by Williamson ( 1985 ) and Barzel (  ), first-best optimal investment
would require an elaborate system of contingency contracting and monitoring, both of which are
constrained by information costs.
Figure 5 also illustrates how agency theory can solve what Otsuka and Hayami assert is
the "major remaining puzzle" about share tenancy, namely that the tenant's share is almost
universally one-half."  As discussed in Chapter 6, there is substantial variation of landowner shares
due to land quality (including required land improvement such as planting coconut trees in order
to grow coconuts), the labor intensity of the crop, and relative factor prices.  Nonetheless
landowner shares are usually either 1/2, 1/3, 2/3, as Stiglitz (1989) reports, i.e., there is notable
"bunching" of landowner shares Singh (1989), and 1/2 is the most common share.  One reason for
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2.2 A Taxonomy of Agricultural Firms
The principal agency theory of share tenancy that emerged in the 1970s (Stiglitz, 1974;
Holmstrom, 1979; Shavell, 1979)  was, as mentioned above, a theory of the employment relation
between landowner and worker.  Hayami and Otsuka (1993), by suppressing the role of hired
labor, used the same risk-bearing vs. labor-shirking theory to explain the existence of share
tenancy as a relation between landowner and farm manager.  They also called for an integrated
theory of agricultural contracts that explains the interrelated contracts for both management and
labor and other interlinked contracts such as credit.  One approach to a more general theory of
interlinked agricultural contracts is to adopt the perspective of the firm as a nexus of contracts
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Aoki, et.al., 1990; and Yang and Ng, 1993).  Accordingly, the
following sections explore the nature and causes of the agricultural firm.
In the spirit of Frank Knight and Ronald Coase (1937), the firm can be viewed as
an alternative to market organization.  Both Knight and Coase stressed the role of the
entrepreneur as a coordinator of resources.  Knight portrayed the firm as an entrepreneur
with an authority relationship over the other factors.  Coase extended this view by
stressing the cost of using the market, i.e., of contracting the other factors from outside
the firm.  In the words of Douglas North (1981),
According to Coase, the advantage of the firm over transacting in the market is a
gain as a result of a reduction in transaction costs...(presumably at least partly in
consequence of the authority).
Several authors have elaborated on this theme, focusing on the nature and sources
of the transaction costs of using the market.  Barzel (1982) stresses the measurement costs
involved in monitoring contract performance.  Williamson (1975) and Klein, Crawford,
and Alchian (1978) discuss the role of opportunism in increasing the costs of contract
enforcement.  Arrow (1974) discusses conditions under which abandoning the invisible fist31
of authority may reduce the costs of communicating decisions and coordinating
production.
These observations help explain the existence of firms.  They also contain the
rudiments of a theory of the boundaries of the firm, i.e., of what will be purchased from
the market and what activities will be coordinated within the firm.  What is inside and
what is outside the firm depends on the relative advantages of the specialization afforded
by markets vs. the reduction in transaction costs, facilitated by relationships among the
firm's principals. These relationships are governed both by bonding or "F-connections" (cf.
Ben-Porath 1980) and by an explicit or implicit agreement among principals that can be
characterized as a contract prescribing rights and duties of the parties, decision-making
mechanisms, and rewards and/or sanctions for good and bad citizenship.  This
"constitution" and the institutions for prescribing and enforcing future activities constitute
the governance structure of the organization (Williamson 1985).
10
In agricultural organization, share contracts can be classified according to whether
they are essentially labor contracts or relationships among firm principals.  There are two
distinct types of share contracts in agriculture.  One is primarily a labor contract such as
gama or ceblokan arrangements in Asian rice production whereby the worker receives a
small share of the output for harvesting and other specified tasks.
11 The other is more of a
partnership wherein the tenant receives a larger share, typically 1/3 to 2/3, for assuming
the responsibility for most of the work (including supervision) and day-to-day decision-
making (e.g., about the composition and timing of inputs).  Most of the principal-agency
literature, by modelling share tenancy as an employment contract, fails to make this
distinction.  Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) model share tenancy as a partnership, but, unlike
                                                       
10See also Goldberg (1979) for a discussion of "relational exchange."
11Gama or Ilani, as practiced in the Philippines, is an arrangement whereby the worker contracts to weed
and harvest a specified parcel for typically 1/6 of the rice harvested for that parcel; ceblokan, practiced in
Indonesia, typically requires transplanting, in addition to harvesting and weeding, for the same 1/6 share
(Roumasset 1978; Hayami and Kikuchi 1981).  Remarkably, a similar arrangement was documented in
The Constitution of Athens almost 3,000 years ago.  Workers contracted under a sharing arrangement in
ancient Greece were called Hectomori or "sixth partners."32
previous partnership interpretations (Reid 1976, 1978; Hallagan 1978; Murrel 1983), they
abstract from decision-making by the tenant.  In what follows, we reserve the term "share-
tenancy" for medium or long-term relationships where the tenant is a principal in the
agricultural firm and participates in decision-making, as well as worker supervision.
Short-term contracts wherein workers are paid a percentage of the gross are viewed as
labor hiring arrangements similar to piece rate labor contracts.
12
In their "Separation of Ownership and Control," Fama and Jensen (1983b) propose
"a spectrum of organizations" distinguished by the degree of separation of management
and risk-bearing functions.  They emphasize that separation of management (the initiation
and implementation of decisions) does not imply a loss of control (the ratification and
monitoring functions).  Reminiscent of Coase, Fama and Jensen note that the benefit of
"separate" management is the greater degree of specialization that it affords.  While such
specialization comes at greater agency costs, these costs are mitigated by the control
mechanisms retained by the principals.
In agriculture, separation of the management and labor functions is a more useful
characteristic for distinguishing common types of agricultural firms.  Figure 1 illustrates a
spectrum of agricultural firms with separation of work, management, and control
increasing from left to right.  The most unspecialized organization is the owner worker-
manager firm, wherein both labor and management come from the owner's household.  If
the owner hires all the labor and provides only land and management, we call the
arrangement an owner-managed firm.  Clearly intermediate cases are possible, with part of
the labor being hired. The conventional use of the "owner-operated" firm obscures these
differences in specialization.  Sometimes part of the management, including worker
supervision and day-to-day operational decisions, is also hired.  This form is represented at
the far right of Figure 1 and is commonly practiced in plantation agriculture (Uy 1979).
                                                       
12For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of piece rates vs. wage contracts, see Stiglitz
(1974) and Roumasset and Uy (1980).33
The hired-manager form facilitates specialization between both labor and management and
between management and control.
Lease arrangements may be similarly arrayed from the worker-manager form to
owner-manager form wherein most of the labor is hired.  The location of lease contracts in
Figure 6 reflects less variability in the degree of specialization among leasehold than in
owner-operated forms.  The lease worker-manager reflects greater specialization than the
owner worker-manager since the landowner in leasehold arrangements retains some
control over land use decisions.  The lease-manager form is less specialized than the
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Figure 6 also distinguishes the two predominant forms of share tenancy.  We
define pure share tenant arrangement as one in which the landowner and tenant share in
both the decision-making and control aspects of management and in the costs of
productive inputs as well as outputs.  This arrangement resembles a true partnership.
13
Share worker-manager refers to an arrangement where the tenant shoulders all of the input
costs and most of the management.  As Figure 1 suggests, this arrangement is intermediate
between pure share tenancy and the lease worker-manager arrangement.
Since management receives the residual payment, the percentage of the residual
going to management alone will increase, moving towards the right of Figure 1, as
management is increasingly separated from labor.  The quantity and quality of managerial
inputs will therefore be enhanced by the separation of functions.
The advantage of separation of functions is the specialization that it affords.  The
disadvantage is the disincentive effects created when some of the firm participants do not
receive the full value of their marginal product.
14  The additional transaction costs of
separate management will be accepted only when they are outweighed by the benefits of
specialized management.  Specialized management will be increasingly important the
greater is the potential value added of management.
The residual payment also includes rent paid to organization-specific assets.
15  The
hired-manager arrangement gives the residual to the asset control functions of
management and therefore gives the maximum incentive to efficient asset control.  In
share-tenancy partnerships, the tenant's share of the residual compensates him only for his
labor, supervision, and production decisions but also for his equity in the land,
16 draft
                                                       
13Another partnership not dealt with here is the part-owner firm in which one of the partners plays a more
active role in management and owns up to one-half of the equity of the operation.
14The source of the incentive problem is the moral hazard that arises in the face of uncertainty when
inputs cannot be directly measured or indirectly inferred from outputs (Lewis 1980).
15Organization-specific assets include fixed plant and equipment, institutionalized procedures, skills and
other assets that have lower value to other organizations (Fama and Jensen 1983b, 31).
16In the Philippines, for example, tenants can sell cultivation rights for as much as 50 percent of the
market value of the land (Hayami and Kikuchi 1981).35
animals, and some farm equipment.  His share provides partial incentive for investment
and maintenance of these assets.
(b) Patterns, Synthesis, and a Preliminary Hypothesis
Despite the large literature on tenancy, there is little agreement about the stylized
facts of tenure choice under different environments that a theory should be expected to
explain.  In this section we attempt to combine apparently diverse observations about the
incidence and forms of share tenancy across land types of varying productivity to suggest
a possible relationship between the extent of specialization in the agricultural firm and the
value added by land and management.  We do this neither to place inordinate emphasis on
land quality nor on technological determinism but to illustrate how describing and
explaining general relationships between contracts and the environment may help to
elucidate the determinants of economic organization.
We begin with the observation that the incidence of share tenancy relative to the
owner-worker increases with land productivity.  In the Bicol region of the Philippines, the
two predominant types of agricultural firms at the beginning of the Green Revolution (i.e.,
up to at least 1970) were share tenancy and owner-operated family farms with little or no
hired labor.  The Bicol region is comprised of three "rice-bowl" provinces containing the
Bicol River Basin, two island provinces with severe weather problems, poor soil quality,
and high transportation costs, and one "intermediate" province contiguous with the rice
bowl but with uneven topography and a relatively high proportion of upland rice.
Statistics on tenure form show a strikingly higher incidence of share tenancy in the more
productive areas.  In the rice-bowl provinces, 56% of the sample farms were operated by
share tenants vs. 22% owner-operated family farms.  In the intermediate province, there
were 24% owner-operated family farms.  In the intermediate province, there were 24%36
share tenants and 25% owner operators, and in the island provinces there were less than
5% share tenants and 72% owner-operated family farms.
17
On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that the incidence of share tenancy
decreases with land quality relative to the owner-managed firm, which relies on hired
labor. For example, Datta et al. (1986) found, in a large sample of farms in India, that the
incidence of wage contracts relative to share contracts increased with irrigation.  This
suggests the importance of distinguishing different types of owner operator, lease, and
share arrangements. Since owner-operated farms can be more or less specialized than
tenanted farms, depending on the degree of separation between management and labor,
the search for general patterns regarding the relative incidence of share tenanted and
owner operated farms may be a futile one.
In an extensive analysis of Indian data, Bardhan (1984) also finds that the
incidence of share tenancy relative to owner-operated family farms increases with land
quality factors, such as irrigation and rainfall.  His statistics also suggest a rough
correlation between the ratio of share tenancy to lease-worker tenancy and indicators of
land productivity, with share tenancy dominating in the eastern and northwestern parts of
India and fixed-rent tenancy predominant in the southern states.  While this evidence is
consistent with the land productivity-specialization hypothesis, better proxies for land
quality and an indicator of specialization within forms of fixed-lease tenancy would be
useful.
More direct evidence on the land quality-specialization hypothesis is available on
the different forms of share tenancy.  Several previous studies have shown that locational
differences appear to affect both the terms and form of share-tenancy arrangements.
18
                                                       
17These statistics were computed from the 1970 Bureau of Agricultural Economics Integrated Agricultural
Survey of 1013 Bicol farms as reported in Roumasset (1976).  Only 13 sample farms were operated on
leasehold arrangements.  Most of the remaining sample farms were operated by part-owners.
18Several authors have regarded the constancy of tenant shares, typically said to equal 50 percent, as one
of the stylized facts of share tenancy (Bell and Zusman 1976; Hurwicz and Shapiro 1978; Newbery and
Stiglitz 1979; Allen 1985; Eswaran and Kotwal 1985).  These authors have failed to recognize the great
variations in tenancy shares across space, time, and crop (Cheung 1969; Roumasset 1981; Datta et al.
1984; Bardhan 1984).37
Roumasset (1976) found that a sample of rice farms in Laguna, Philippines, with high
rents per hectare and favorable soil conditions, were typically operated under a
"supportive" contract ("pure share tenant" in Figure 1) where the landlords received 50
percent of the gross harvest and paid 50 percent of the cost of seeds and fertilizer.  For the
sample farms in Albay province, where soil and weather conditions are worse, share-lease
or "nonsupportive" contracts were used under which landowners received only 1/3 of the
harvest but did not share in the costs.
19  These findings were later generalized for both rice
and nonrice tenants. Both output and input shares of landowners were found to be
positively correlated with land quality in the Philippines, Java (Indonesia), and Bangladesh
(Roumasset and James 1979; Roumasset 1981; Hayami and Kikuchi 1981; Ali 1979).
Bardhan (1984) also found a strong association between the cost sharing by the landowner
and the landowner's share and between landowner's share and land quality.
Both the landlord and the tenant do more management in pure share tenancy
(supportive) arrangements.  At least in the Philippine case, there also appeared to be
substantially more hired labor under pure share tenancy, with the tenant providing
supervision, input decisions, and day-to-day management.  In summary, relatively
unspecialized share worker-management arrangements tend to be more common on
poorer quality land; on better land the share tenant specializes more on management, and
cost sharing is used to help induce efficient input use.
Thus a number of disparate observations about the incidence and forms of share
tenancy are suggestive of an overall relationship between land productivity and
specialization in agricultural organization.  In the next sections we explore a possible
theoretical explanation for this relationship and then illustrate a more direct method of
verification.
                                                       
19In share-worker arrangements, such as the sharecropper in the post-bellum American South, landowners
commonly received more than 50 percent but also provided the inputs and made most of the production
decisions. These arrangements are relatively rare in Asian agriculture.38
3.0  Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Development of the 
Hypothesis
3.1 A Principal-Agency Approach to Positive Agency Theory
In this section, we attempt to model efficient contract choice in the presence of
information and enforcement costs of input use.  Most of the principal-agency literature in
economics has focused on labor shirking.  But investments in land improvements may also
be "shirked" by "mining" the land or, more generally, by failing to maintain the optimal
level of fertility and productive capacity.  Managerial inputs, both for decision-making and
supervision, may also be shirked.
The model that follows uses the principal agency framework to make explicit use
just what is being optimized but borrows from positive agency theory the notion that more
than one input is susceptible to shirking.  This allows the optimal organizational form to
vary according to the environment without requiring large differences in risk-bearing
abilities.  The model also incorporates an important disadvantage of fixed lease contracts
that helps to explain the unpopularity of such contracts in many environments.
We first extend the principal-agency model (see, e.g., Stiglitz 1974; Newbery and
Stiglitz 1979; and Lewis 1980) to allow for two sources of shirking.  Represent the value
of output, D, as a function of both labor, x, and land maintenance/improvement, z.  For
simplicity assume two periods such that the present value of output can be expressed as:
(11) ()( ) DD x D x z r =+ 111 21 2 ,, , , qq
where D1 and D2 are the discounted value of output functions for periods 1 and 2, q1 and
q2 are the two stochastic variables and r is the real discount rate.  Investment in land, z, is
made in the first period and increases output in the second period.  Positive investments
such as improving or maintaining the irrigation ditches increase z.  Negative investments,
e.g., allowing noxious weeds to propagate or intensive cultivation practices that "mine"39
the soil fertility, decrease z.  In order to clarify the meaning of efficient contract choice,
we abstract from "managerial shirking" in the mathematical version of the model.
The agent (e.g., tenant) chooses the level of investment in land and labor in the
two periods so as to maximize the expected utility, U.  The principal (landowner) chooses
a payment schedule, Pi, which relates the agent's income to D and the principal's
(imperfect) monitoring of the inputs.  The agent's income can thus be expressed as P =
Pi(D,x1,x2,z) where the principal chooses i from the set of possible contracts, C, and the
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and where m is monitoring expenditures by the principal and U is the utility level available
to the agent in his best alternative.
The principal agency formulation provides a convenient measure of the efficiency
of contracts.  Define maximum unconstrained
20 expected profits as:
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* are optimum inputs under the assumption of costless
measurement and enforcement of input levels.
The inefficiency or agency cost of the ith contract can be expressed as:
(14) Ai =p i - Vi
where Vi is the solution of (12) for a given i.  Since p
*
 is a constant, finding the highest
Vi yields the same contract as solving for the lowest Aj, i.e.,
(5) {} {} iV V jA A ij || == =
*
                                                       
20The terms "constrained" and "unconstrained" are used here, in the sense of constrained Pareto optimality
(e.g., Newbery and Stiglitz 1979), to distinguish models that incorporate transaction costs from models
that abstract from transaction costs.  Unconstrained profits are also equivalent to "first-best" profits and
constrained profits are equivalent to "second-best" profits in the sense of Lewis (1980).40
where V = MaxV and A MinA
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Equations (11-14) provide a sense in which the assumption of positive agency
theory, that contracts evolve so as to minimize agency costs, is equivalent to the
assumption of principal agency theory, that equilibrium contracts maximize the
constrained objective function of the principal.
21  The framework also provides a
clarification of the meaning of agency costs, defined by Fama and Jensen (1984) as:
Agency costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of
contracts among agents with conflicting interests, plus a residual loss incurred
because the cost of full enforcement of contracts exceeds the benefits.
In the principal agency framework, the costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding are
represented bymi
*, and the residual loss is p
** * -- () DP ii  where DP ii
** -  is the
maximum constrained profits to the principal, before accounting formi
*.
The proposition that "efficient" contracts minimize "agency costs" obscures a 3-
level hierarchy of optimization problems.  Since "minimize" refers to the choice across
contracts, "agency costs" must be interpreted to mean the least cost combination of
measurement and enforcement activities associated with a particular contract, i.e., mi
*
.
Moreover, the optimal m is chosen subject to optimal shirking by the agent.  These levels
of optimization are transparent in the graphical exposition of agency theory employed
below (Figure 7).
                                                       
21To maintain this correspondence where the principal is not risk neutral, then V must be defined to be net
of a risk premium.42
3.2  A Theory of Specialization and Tenure Choice
We can now use the agency cost framework to explain the apparent association
between land productivity and the degree of specialization in the agricultural firm.  In
particular, we wish to illustrate why a landowner might employ a tenant on a fixed lease
basis to provide the labor and supervision for land of low productivity but would be more
likely to hire wage workers if there were substantial potential benefits from investing in
land maintenance and improvements.  Following Eswaran and Kotwal, since we wish to
develop alternative explanations for agricultural contracts to the conventional moral
hazard theory, we abstract from differences in ability to bear risk between landlord and
worker.
The advantage of lease arrangements is well known.  By paying labor the residual,
incentives for labor shirking are eliminated.  An important disadvantage of fixed-rent
tenancy, aside from possible risk-bearing problems, is the possibility of "mining the land"
(Marshall) or "land shirking."  If the fixed-lease contract is only for one period or if
enforcement costs make collection of period 2 rent difficult, the tenant may choose to
deplete the productivity of the farm in period 1 and abandon the farm in period 7.  That is,
if farming techniques are available that sufficiently enhance first period output at the
expense of maintaining the productive value of the land, then the utility maximizing
strategy may be to maximize his income in the first period break (or not renew) his lease
and rejoin the labor force in the second period.
22  This model clearly has relevance beyond
two periods.  So long as the landowner's rights to collect future rents are attenuated (e.g.,
by flight of the tenant or the threat of land reform laws by the state), then the tenant's
incentive to stint land improvement inputs will discourage landowners from renting their
land out on a fixed fee basis.  Moreover, since the prospects of technological change and
                                                       
22We assume that there is sufficient labor mobility that period 1 performance will not markedly affect the
wage received in period 2.  Alternatively, the second period wage penalty for poor performance in period
one may be incorporated into the enforcement technology for the lease contract.43
other forces outside the control of the contracting parties render the competitive rental
value of land uncertain in the future, fixed-rent contracts will tend to be of limited
duration.
The cost of land shirking will depend primarily on the marginal efficiency of
investment in land maintenance and land improvement.  Land with low natural
productivity and artificial improvements tends to be less vulnerable to depreciation than
land with high natural productivity (e.g., fertility and low pest population) and
improvements (e.g., land levelling, terracing, irrigation).  While land shirking may be a
minimal problem in some environments, in others it may be the predominant determinant
of agricultural organization. In contrast, labor shirking is less environmentally determined
and more related to the amount of monitoring.  It is therefore plausible that in
environments with little predisposition for land shirking, contracts will be chosen to
mitigate labor shirking and thereby save on costly monitoring.  Where land shirking is
potentially a major problem, however, contracts may be chosen for their incentive for
investment.  In these cases, direct monitoring of labor can be used to manage labor
shirking.
The theory of environmentally determined contractual choice sketched above is
presented in terms of agency costs in Figure 2.  In each of the four quadrants, agency
costs (AC) are the sum of shirking costs (SC) and monitoring costs (MC).  Each graph
corresponds to a particular contract in a particular environment.  The two graphs on the
top represent "invulnerable" land and the bottom two represent "vulnerable" land.  The
graphs on the left correspond to rent contracts; those on the right, to wage contracts.
Following the assumptions proposed in the previous paragraph, shirking costs under wage
contracts are shown as being relatively responsive to monitoring and relatively
unresponsive to the environment.
Relative contractual efficiency can be seen by comparing the point of minimum
agency costs (MAC) for the two contracts under each environment.  The assumptions44
implicit in the shapes of the shirking curves imply that the relative efficiency of wage
contracts increases with the vulnerability to land shirking.  Figure 2 illustrates the case
where in one type of land in sufficiently invulnerable to shirking such that rent contracts
dominate and another type sufficiently vulnerable that wage contracts dominate.  The
graphs thus illustrate how different contracts may be preferred in different environments.
Factors other than the marginal efficiency of investment may also influence
vulnerability.  Greater attenuation of property rights and more uncertainty about
equilibrium rents in future periods render the landowner vulnerable to losses in the value
of land relative to the first-best optimum.  Another determinant of agricultural
organization is the share of value added attributable to land (including capital
improvements), labor and management. Where management contributes a substantial
proportion to value added, organizational forms that reward specialized management will
tend to be favored.  We hypothesize that management is relatively more important on
better quality land.  This provides a complementary explanation of the association between
the degree of specialization and land productivity.
4.0   Statistical Verification: An Illustration
As we observed in section 2, most existing data is not suitable to provide direct
verification of the specialization and land quality hypothesis.  This section reports on a
sample of Philippine sugarcane farms wherein the different forms of owner-operated farms
are distinguished and ranked according to the degree of specialization.  Philippine
sugarcane farms show a large diversity in contractual forms—from the subsistence owner-
operated to owner-controlled farms with hired labor and management.  The sample of 60
sugarcane farms described below exhibits a wide range of contractual forms, facilitating a
more complete illustration of how contracts respond to locational factors that affect the
vulnerability of land and management to shirking.45
Owner-managed farms seem to have better land, large farm sizes and more
intensive application of cash inputs such as fertilizer and chemicals than share-tenants.  A
larger portion of their cultivation is also done by tractors.  Owner-operated farms or
subsistence farms tend to have poor land and less intensive application of fertilizers than
share tenants.  A ranking of contracts based on the extent of application of inputs shows a
positive relationship between factor intensity and extent of specialization.
The more specialized forms of organization tend to predominate in the highly
productive "sugar bowl" province.  In the Laguna and Tarlac areas, which are less suitable
for sugarcane production, share-tenancy and owner-operated farms are more common.
Several leased farms were observed with hired agricultural workers and a lessee-manager.
These contracts were classified as lease-manager arrangements.
The task of econometrically documenting the relationship between contractual
choice and environmental characteristics is rather awkward.  Both the environment and the
contractual arrangement are multiattributed entities and most of the attributes defy
accurate measurement.  It is presumably these difficulties that largely account for the
tendency to ignore the role of environment in contractual choice.  But data problems do
not constitute a sufficient justification for ignoring fundamental determinants of economic
organization.
The theory developed above focuses on the degree of separation between labor
and management as the primary characteristic of tenure choice.  However, what we
observe is not the degree of separation but the category of tenure choice.  Accordingly,
we rank tenure choice to the degree of specialization as shown in Table 3.  Owner
operators manage and cultivate their own farms,
23 and have the least specialization.  Share
tenanted farms are largely managed and partly cultivated by the tenants.
24  Harvesting the
cane of share tenanted farms is done primarily by hired labor.  In the owner-managed
                                                       
23Specialization within the family is not considered here.  The family is considered as one unit, rather
than as a group of factor owners.
24Since all share tenants in the sample receive 50 percent of the output we do not distinguish here between
share tenants and share manager.46
farms in the sample, all labor is hired, i.e., provided by separate agents thereby involving a
greater degree of specialization than the share tenanted and lease-managed farms.  On
sugar plantations, even the plantation manager and the supervisory personnel are hired.48
One important characteristic of the farming environment is the vulnerability of the
farms to what we have called land shirking.  The more vulnerable lands are those with
potential for fertility reduction and those that continually practice control of potentially
destructive weeds, insects and diseases in order to keep the pest population low.  Farms
that continually cope with high pest populations (e.g., because of high populations on
nearby farms) and have inherently low fertility are less vulnerable to land shirking.  High
productivity farms are more prone to land shirking than low productivity lands that are
incapable of generating high rents.  Accordingly, a land quality index, measured as
expected revenue per hectare minus production costs, is used as a proxy for vulnerability
to land shirking.
25
For simplicity, we have assumed a linear relationship between the true (but
unobserved) specialization index and land quality.  OLS regression of the observed
specialization rank and the land quality index will not provide either unbiased or efficient
estimates of the underlying relationship.  The error terms of the linear model do not
conform to Guass-Markov assumptions.  Moreover, the OLS estimates of the ordinal
dependent variable may fall outside the specified range.  The alternative estimation
procedure used here is the ordinal probit model developed by Mckelvey and Zavoina
(1975; see also Madalla 1983, 46-9).
The results of the maximum likelihood estimation show a positive relationship
between specialization rank and land quality.  The land quality coefficient yielded a t-ratio
of 2.45, which is significant at the 1 percent level (using a z-test).  The conventional F-test
to test the significance of the multiple correlation is not appropriate with the ordinal probit
model.  Significance of regression equation can be tested by computing minus twice the
log likelihood ratio, in this case 6.10.  This statistic is distributed as chi-square and is
significant at the 5 percent level.  Despite the rough nature of our proxy and the use of
                                                       
25See Roumasset and James (1979) for a discussion of the relationship between land quality and rent.  Not
only are rents higher on high quality land but, under profit maximization, the output elasticity of land is
also higher, implying a higher landlord's share on tenant farms.49
only one independent variable, the results are consistent with our hypothesis that the type
of land has a significant influence on tenure choice.  Where land quality is low and land
shirking relatively unimportant, there is a tendency to give the residual payment to labor
and thereby control labor shirking.  Where land shirking is relatively important, labor
shirking tends to be controlled directly by supervision; landowners retain most the
residual, thus providing incentive for land maintenance.
The land quality/maintenance hypothesis was also tested for a sample of rice farms
in Nepal and the results are even more striking, with 78 percent of the contractual
arrangements being correctly predicted (Sharma 1984).  Owner-management was ranked
as the most specialized followed by share tenancy and fixed lease respectively.  The
specialization rank was then regressed on a measure of land quality and a number of
control variables, again using the ordinal multinomial probit model.  Similar evidence of
the effect of land quality on tenure choice has been documented for India (Datta et al.
1986; Nugent et al. 1991).
5.0 Summary and Conclusions
Tenure arrangements are usually modelled as alternative modes of employment.
We suggest an alternative view of agricultural organization in which agricultural firms are
classified according to the degree of separation between labor, land, and management.
While the conceptual framework used descends from positive agency theory (e.g., Jensen
and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983a), we have shown how a principal agency
framework can be used to clarify the meaning of "minimum agency cost."
The tenure choice literature to date has focused on three alternative
arrangements—rent, share, and wage.  Classifying agricultural firms by separation
between labor and management requires a different and more detailed taxonomy.  The
"owner worker-manager" firm with no hired labor is completely unspecialized.  The50
"owner-manager" firm with hired labor is quite specialized and the "hired-manager" firm
even more so, even though all three are commonly classified as owner-operator
arrangements.  Moreover, owner-managed firms should not be confused with wage
contracts, as in the conventional taxonomy, because labor is often hired on a piece-rate or
share basis.  There are two main types of share tenancy, one with cost sharing and one
without, where cost-sharing arrangements are combined with higher landowner shares.
Employment contracts, where workers receive a small share of the output in return for
performing particular tasks, e.g., harvesting and weeding, are essentially piece rate
arrangements for hiring labor and do not constitute share tenancy firms.
Once firms are arrayed according to the degree of separation and consequent
specialization, a number of apparently diverse observations about tenure choice seem to fit
a more general pattern—the higher the land productivity, the higher the degree of
specialization. A method was developed for obtaining a more direct verification of this
pattern and illustrated using a sample of sugarcane farms in the Philippines.
Two determinants of specialization were identified which are likely to be related to
land quality—vulnerability to land shirking and the importance of management.  Where
land shirking is a potential problem and the scope for management errors large, then the
firm's incentives are more likely to be oriented towards efficient management, with labor
shirking controlled by direct monitoring.  Where production decisions and asset
management are less important, then organizations geared to minimizing labor shirking are
more likely to be chosen.
The empirical results, while significant, do not prove that land productivity is
inordinately influential in shaping agricultural organization.  The results do help to
illustrate, through the example of land quality, how relationships between environment and
the mode of production may be statistically documented.  Since production technique and
tenure choice are determined simultaneously, it is misleading to attribute productivity51
differences to tenure choice or other aspects of agricultural organization.
26  The
comparative institutions view, in which the relative efficiency of alternative arrangements
depends on the physical and economic environment, also highlights the possible danger of
government efforts to "reform" agricultural institutions and to force farmers to conform to
the "best" tenure arrangements. On the other hand, where government attempts to design
better institutions are inevitable, e.g., for some aspects of public land management, then
the agency perspective may help planners to learn from the rich variety of indigenous
institutions.
27
                                                       
26For example, several authors have cited the inverse relationship between farm size and yield per hectare
as evidence of dualism in the agricultural sector and have concluded that Robin Hood land reform would
increase agricultural production.
27The agency or transaction cost approach is an integral part of the New Institutional Economics
(Williamson 1975, 1985; Roumasset 1978).52
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